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AN OUTLINE OF TAUGHT LAW
NOTES ON. AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY - THE
BEGINNINGS TO HOLMES AND POUND
HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN*
"Law Schools make tough law."--Maitland.
I.
A BOOK
"tlie almost Scriptural authority of Blackstone in our early law:'
-Charles Warren.
Among the early judges who were teachers as well as judges
and who bespoke juristic philosophy from the bench, none were
of greater importance than Wilson, Kent and Story. All three
were teachers and writers upon the nature and purpose of law and
it was chiefly through their work as teachers and writers that
juristic creeds became articulate. It is to their work and to the
more significant teachers who followed them that we turn n an
effort to note how the fundamental problems of Jurisprudence
have been formulated in this country.
Bfft before speaking of these men, something must be said
about the influence of a book. Certain it is that the influence of
Blackstone's Commentaries gave great impetus to the reception
*A.B., 1927, University of Iowa, LL.B., 1933, Yale University; J.S.D.,
1934, Cornell University; Professor of Law, Georgetown University;
Major, Judge Advocate General's Department; author of Who Wrote the
Mirror of Justices? (1942) 58 Law Quar. Rev. 265, Federalization-Design
for Corporate Reform in a .National Economy (1942) 91 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
91, Aluminum and Monopoly; A Phase of an Unsolved Problem (1939)
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 509; Municipal Debt Readjustment. Present Relief
and Future Policy (1938) 23 Corn. L. Quar. 365, Provisional Arrest and
Detention in International Extradition (1934) 23 Geo. L. J. 37 and other
articles in various legal periodicals.
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of English law in the legal system of the colonies.' Indeed, it has
been suggested that the common law as Blackstone expounded it
became "the fundamental law of America."'2 Paradoxically enough,
during the Revolutionary era the Commentaries were invoked to
justify much that must indeed 'have shocked and grieved their
Tory author, than 'whom none was more conservative and none
more lavish in his praise of the English constitution.3 What is
more, the book grew in the influence which it exerted iii the
new nation which had just espoused and proclaiied principles
in blazing contrast to those of the dominant party in England, of
which Sir William Blackstone was an important member.4 Seem-
ingly the explanation must rest on the dire need felt by students
and lawyers for a convenient, authoritative exposition, a need so
great that it could overcome prejudices against it even among
those who might be expected to comprehend its true political inter-
pretation.5
In England the Commentaries met with violent attack from
Jeremy Bentham, Joseph Priestley and "Junius"' for a variety of
reasons.7 In America, if Blackstone's influence was subjected to
attack by a very few men, those attackers were, however, men of
the greatest eminence. In the forefront was none other than Thomas
Jefferson, who, apart from being in direct opposition to Black-
"'The fact that such a large mass of legal detail was made available in
one work, in an interesting and easily mastered form, made Blackstone's
work particularly useful in eighteenth century America. The Commentarieg
served as the principal means of the colonists' information as to the state of
English law in general." Plucknett, A Concise History of the Commion
Law (2nd ed. 1936) 254. See also Hazeltine, Blackstone 2 Encyc. of Soc.
Sciences (1931) 581, Hammond's Blackstone (1890) 108, Dillon, Law and
Jurisprudence of England and America (1895) 298, Zane, Story of the Law(1927) 338-359; Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law
(1921) 110-111, Jones' Blackstone (1915) XXIX, Odgers, Blackstone(1919) 28 Yale L. J. 542, 566, Oliphant, The New Legal Education (1930)
131 Nation 493, Thayer, Teaching of English Law at Universities, Legal
Essays (1907) 367-368.
-Wickersham, Presentation Address of Blackstone Memorial (1924) 10
A. B. A. J. 576-578.
34 Blackstone Commentaries (Jones ed. 1915) 443, Andrews, Colonial
Background of the American Revolution (1924) 208-209.
42 Junius Letters (Wade ed. 1894) 268.
'See Comment and reference, supra note 1.
GFor Benthamr's attacks see Bentham, A Fragment o" Government
(Annon. 1776), A Comment on the Commentaries (Everett ed, 1928) ; Ridell,
Bentham on Blackstone: A Review (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 676; Alexander,
Bentham (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 141. For Priestley's attack see 4
Blackstone, Commentaries (Jones ed. 1915) 50, note 4. For Junius' attack
(directed rather toward Blackstone's political acts) see I Junius Letters
(Wade ed. 1894) 165.
'Bentham's attacks were prompted by his zeal as a law reformer,
Priestley's largely by his very different views upon religious conformity
and "Junius" by political difference with Blackstone in Parliament.
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stone-s political convictions, was, after his country settled down to
peaceful ways, deeply interested in the beginning of legal educa-
tion in Virginia.' In the first place, he thought ill of text book
study as an adequate preparation for the legal profession, though
admitting certain of the virtues which the book possessed. So lie
pronounced it to be superficial, to be read only after Coke and
other digests.' Indeed, Jefferson added (and Langdell must have
thrilled to this passage) that while the work was "lucid in its ar-
rangement correct in its matter, classical in style" it was only
an elementary book and "the great mass of law books from which
it was extracted is still to be consulted on minute investigation.'"
But what seemed to Jefferson a far more serious criticism of the
Commentaries was based upon his dread of its effect upon the
political philosophy of youthful students."1 This is readily under-
standable if one remembers that Jefferson was an agrarian demo-
crat, the son of the Frontier,12 and that his prime exaction of any
government was that it be readily responsive to change.'- Jeffer-
son doubtless repnembered Mansfield's attitude during the Revo-
lution and with all that he disliked in Mansfield he associated
Blackstone. His fears are thus vividly expressed.
"You -will recollect that before the Revolution, Coke Littleton
(sic) was the universal elementary book of law students, and a
sounder whig never wrote. You remember also that our
lawyers were then all whigs. But when lis.black-letter text and
uncouth but cunning learning got out of fashion, and the homed
Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the student's horn-book, from
that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began
sFor an account of Jefferson's attitude toward Blackstone see Water-
man, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries (1933) 27 II. Law
Rev. 629.
OThe law of England may be likened to a road divided into distinct
stages, at each of which a review is taken of the road passed over so far.
Among the reviews, Jefferson lists Bracton, Bacon, Coke, and Blackstone,
6 Jefferson, Writings (Washington ed.) 291.
106 Jefferson, Writings "(Washington ed.) 292, 315.
"Thus he writes, "I fear nothing for our liberty from the assaults of
force; but I have seen and felt much, and fear more from English books,
English prejudices, English manners, and apes, dupes and designs among
our profession crafts." 6 Jefferson, Writings (Washington ed.) 335, and
again "I ascribe much of this (adherence to England and monarchy in pref-
erence to their own country on the part of colonial lawyers) to the substitu-
tion of Blackstone for my Lord Coke, as an elementary work." 6 Writings
(Washington ed.) 334.
"2Parrington, The Colonial Mind (1927) 342-356.
13"And what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not
worried from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of the re-
sistance?" 5 Jefferson, Works (Ford ed.) 362; "Every constitution, then
and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years" 5 Jefferson, WVorks(Ford ed.) 121.
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to slide into toryism, and nearly all the young brood of lawyers
now are of that hue."
14
Some years before Jefferson expressed such views, James Wil'
son had criticized certain of the preachments of Blackstone. 1e
took issue witli Blackstone on the latter's view that English liber-
ties were human in origin.11 Wilson maintained that these liberties
were natural rights and not subject to a supreme authority which
Blackstone contended inhered in every government. 10 Though
Wilson is known to have quoted Blackstone for the proposition
that there is a fundamental law of nature which is superior to
human law,1 7 he did so merely to confound British statesmen with
the learning of one of their own group. Wilson, like Jefferson,
lamented that
"by the use of the Commentaries as the first book, the ninds of
students have been 'filled with ideas and principles not at all
adapted to, and indeed in direct conflict with, the fundamental
principles of American law, as there has been no corrective, these
impressions cling to them after they have become lawyers."'
However, unlike Jefferson, he did not regard the Commentaries as
superficial, but approved the book outside the field of public law.
But the tide could not be stemmed and even at Virginia, Jefferson's
own university, Blackstone came into its own as a text, It was,
however, a remade Blackstone-the work of St. George Tucker.
Now Tucker was a teacher and he shared Jefferson's view that
law study must go behind Blackstone and like his patron believed
that the supplanting of Coke upon Littleton by the Conmnentaries
would flood the profession with "a great number, whose superficial
knowledge of the law has been almost as soon forgotten as ac-
quired. '"' Tucker, however, accorded a far greater degree of
profundity to the book than. did Jefferson.2 0 In his edition of the
Commentaries, he was unstinting in the praise which lie gave to
Jefferson's legislation in Virginia in the preface, lauding the lat-
1412 Jefferson, Works (Ford ed.) 456. Of interest is the correspondence
between Jefferson and Madison on the choice of texts and a professor for
the Umv. of Virginia, 9 Madison, Writings (1910) 218.
'
1 Blackstone, Commentaries (Jones ed. 1915) 127
162 Wilson, Works (Bird Wilson ed. 1804) 456-475. For further light
on Wilson's attitude see 1 Hammond, Blackstone (1890) 111-117 (Editor's
notes)
173 Wilson, op. cit. 206.
IsSee Andrews; American Law (1900) viii.
191 Tucker, Blackstone (1803) pt. 1, p. iv. Note Jefferson's character-
ization of "Blackstone lawyers" as "ephemeral insects of the law" 6 Jeffer-
son, Writings (Washington ed.) 65-66. x
2OTo Tucker, Blackstone was a kind of jurist, philosopher, historian,
antiquarian and classicist all rolled into one. Tucker, op. cit. p. vi,
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ter's efforts as a means of insuring the continuance of republican
government. Moreover, he added bulky appendices republican-
izing the treatise so as to more nearly accord with the views of
American law students.21
Now those attacks upon Blackstone are of considerable sig-
nificance because they indicate a good deal pf thinking about the
nature of law against a distinctly American background and about
the kind of training desirable in equipping one for.the profession.
But the Blackstone tide rolled on until, as is commonly asserted,
the Commentaries became the foundation upon which American
law built.22 -What then were the cardinal tenets with which Black-
stone so long bound American juristic thought? In the first place,
Blackstone was not to be hobgoblined into consistency.2 He was
to furnish a well nigh verbatim text for John Austin when lie de-
fined law as a "rule of action dictated by some superior and which
the inferior is bound to obey. '24 But along with that definition he
propounds the most extreme doctrines of natural law.'-" Thus
Blackstone stands as one aiding and abetting the makeshift union
21
-These appendices discussed, with a marked Jeffersoman bias, such
questiois as the sovereignty of the people, the introduction of.the English
common law, freedom of the press, the bill for public education in Virginia,
the right of expatriation, the merits of tie jury system and Jefferson's law
of descents.22
"The effect (of the acceptance of Blackstone in America) wvas, that
upon all questions, of private law at least, this work stood for the law itself
throughout the country, and at least for a generation to come exercised an
influence upon the jurisprudence of the New Nation, which no other work
has enjoyed, and to which no other work can possibly now attain." I Ham-
mond, Blackstone (1890) ix. For a like view see Dillon, Laws and Juris-
prudence of England and America (1895) 298 also Zane, Story of Law
(1927) 359-359.23"Consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds."-Ralph \\aldo Emer-
son.
24Austin defined a law as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an
intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him." Juris-
prudence (3rd ed.) 88. For Austin, Jurisprudence seems to be nothing more
than the plural of "a law" for lie defines jurisprudence as having to do with
rules set by men to men, provided they are established by determinate po-
litical superiors. Ibid 89. See Pound, "Theories of Law" (1912) 22 Yale
L. J. 114, 140-142.
25"This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God
himself is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding all
over the globe in all countries and at all times, no human laws are of any
validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their
force and all their authority, mediately or immediately from the original."
1 Commentaries (Cooley 3rd ed. 1884) 40. Again, Blackstone says "Upon
these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation depend
all human laws; and that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to
contradict these. And herein, it is that human laws have their greatest
force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent,
human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to tie
former." Ibid. 42.
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between analytical and philosophical (natural-law) jurisprudence,
By virtue of Blackstone's almost convincing inconsistency, he gave
considerable aid to the grim business of forcing a natural rights
philosophy to do service along with a rigid Austinian scleme.20
By his exaltation of "the rule of action dictated by some superior"
idea, Blackstone was able to "affirm that the power of Parliament
is absolute and -without control,"' 27 and so to add to the stock of
American political ideas the notion of legislative sovereignty-a
notion which did not finally establish itself in our constitutional
system. Of these two opposing ideas in Blackstone, our written
Constitution took the higher law teachings and clothed them with
the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people and
then backed up those teachings with the doctrine of judicial re-
view 28
The more important measure of the abiding influence of
Blackstone is perhaps not to be derived from verbatim quotation
of his words but from the afterglow29 that trails the study of the
book. The Commentaries are a tour through a legal paradise.
What, is good is good-in fact, it could not conceivably be better.
The fact that such a philosophy was indoctrinated into every
lawyer at so early a date in our history could not fail to make our
lawyers receptive to the practical consequences, if not the sys-
tematic exposition, of John Austin's analytical jurisprudence
which presupposed, if-not a legal paradise, certainly a finished and
fully developed legal system. This same Blackstonman philosophy
fertilized American soil so that it effectively received the seed of
the historical jurist. For the historical jurist, what had developed
through custom was good, it was not to be arrested or disturbed.
26"Eloquent, suave, undismayed in the presence of the palpable con-
tradictions in his (Blackstone's) pages, adept in insinuating new points of
view without unnecessarily disturbing old ones, lie is the very exemplat
and model of legalistic and judicial obscurantism." Corwin, The Higher
Law Background of American Constitutional Law (1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev.
365-405. 1
27
"True it is, that what the Parliament doth no authority upon earth
can undo." 1 Commentaries (Cooley 3rd ed. 1884) 161, cf. De Lohne,
"Parliament can do anything except make a man a woman or a woman a
man," quoted by Corwin, op. cit. 407
28Professor Corwin avows that backing up "the higher law" by the
doctrine of judicial review started "the higher law" upon the most fruitful
period, juristically, since the days of Justinian. op. cit. 409.
29"Afterglow".-a term applied to the effect of a legal writing as a
whole upon the reader by Karl N. Llewellyn. See his Some Realism About
Realism-Responding to Dean Pound (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1229,
note 22 (applied to Underhill Moore's An Institutional Approach to the
Laws of Commercial Banking (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 703.
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And in Anglo-American Jurisprudence it was Blackstone who told
the historical jurist just what had developed through custom.
Ii.
THE EARLY TEACHERS-WYTHE TO COOLEY
In the United States, law first became an academic pursuit at
the- College of William and Mary. In 1779, George WVythe was
named to a professorship "of law and police" at the instance of
Jefferson who' had studied law under him privately3 0 We can but
regret the loss of his manuscript lectures before such a time as they
might have been printed.3' There are indications that in his teach-
ing he was no mere servile imitator of Blackstone02 and that in
losing his lectures we lost an important statement of legal philos-
ophy dealing with the changes in American jurisprudence brought
about by the new written constitutions, instruments which were
wholly strange to Blackstone. As a judge lie seems to have been
the first to lay down the principle of the overruling power of the
judiciary.
"Nay nor, if the whole legislature, an event to be deprecated,
should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by the
people, I, in administering the public justice of the country, will
meet the united powers at my seat in this tribunal, and, pointing
to the constitution, will say to them, 'here is the limit of your
authority; and hither glhall you go, but no further.' ,,3
Mention has been made of Tucker, WNVythe's successor at William
and Mary, and his first American edition of Blackstone. In the
lengthy appendices Tucker supplied us with essays upon the re-
lation of Blackstone's ideas to American political and legal institu-
tions. In one of his appendices, he deals with the "indispensable
necessary" natural equality of rights under our polity in the face
of the patent fact of inequality. The explanation has now become
a commonplace:
"By equality, in a democracy is to be understood, equality of civil
rights, and not of condition. Equality of rights necessarily pro-
duces inequality of possessions. 3
4
3
eReed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921) 116-117.3 1Wythe's manuscript lectures were extant in 1810, being mentioned by
John Tyler (Father of the President) in a letter to Jefferson who said of
them: "They are highly worthy of publication, and it is a pity that they
should be lost to society and such a monument to his memory be neglected..'
1 Letters and Times of the Tylers, 249.32Reed, op. cit. 116-117
334 Call. (Va.) 5 (1813).
31 Tucker, Blackstone (1903) Appendix, p. 28.
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Among the absolute rights of every American, "the immediate gift
of his Creator," we find the rights of personal opinion, conscience
and religion, besides freedom of speech and press?1
Ten years after his first experiment, James Wilson, in the
presence of the President and Mrs. Washington, began his weekly
six o'clock non-vocational Blackstoman lectures at Dr. Franklin's
College of Philadelphia.3 6 These lectures have come d6wn to us"7
and they supply us with the best statement we have of the con-
sidered legal theories of one of the founding fathers. One may see
in his pamphlets how, during heated days of Revolution, Wilson
had demonstrated a stout faith in the concept of natural law
Though the purpose of his law lectures was entirely different, they
reveal that their author continued true to that faithY8 The chief
sources for his legal principles were precisely those from which
he drew his political principles during the war-the civilians,",
especially Dutch and French publicists.
Wilson's idea of the nature of law is set forth in his lecture
"Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation." There he
declares that law is a great universal. That idea he expresses in
these words
"Order, proportion, and fitness pervade the universe. Around us,
we see, within us, we feel, above us, we admire, a rule from which
a deviation cannot, or should not, or will not be made."40
After exploring the many possible definitions of law, he
espouses the classification of law into huran and divine. There is
something peculiarly Thomistic in his proposition that Natural
law is one phase of the law of God and that in so far as it applies
to man (as distinguished from irrational and inanimate parts of
creation, to which it also applied) it is to be discovered by con-
sultation of the Scriptures and the use of reason and the moral
sense. In maintaining that human law (municipal and inter-
national) must own as its ultimate sanction the law of Nature he
flatly denies Blackstone's pre-Austinian theory that human law of
necessity involves a command by a superior to an inferior.4" To
352 Tucker, Blackstone Appendix, p. 3, l1ff.30Tlie College of Philadelphia later became the University of Pennsyl-
vania, Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921) 122.
371n two editions of Wilson's Works, that by his son Bird Wilson(1804) in three volumes and the edition by Andrews (1896) in two volumes.38The fullest discussion of natural law is found in Chapter III of the
Lectures. 1 Wilson, Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) 95-12739For an enumeration of the number of citations to Dutch and French
publicists, see Pound, Theories of Law (1912) 22 Yale L. J. 114, 127, note 50,
401 Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) 49.
411bid.
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Wilson, human laws are not commands of any sort; rather they
are the applications of principles of law to particular situations
(rules?)1 " To Wilson, the sine qua non of law is not authority,
but reason. Of course, there were weighty political reasons for
Wilson's denial of the Blackstoman theory of sanctions, he saw in
that theory a threat to republicanism. This is observed in his state-
ment that Blackstone
"has defined municipal laws, as applied to the law of England,
upon principles to which I must asgigni the epithets dangerous and
unsound. It is of high import to the liberties of the United States
that the seeds of despotism be n6t permitted to lurk at the roots
of our municipal law."43
Nor could Wilson for a moment admit the human origin of Eng-
lish liberties for these too were deemed natural rights not subject
to a supreme power supposed to inhere in every government."
Now any natural law scheme must be as much, if not more. a moral
scheme as a legal scheme, and that calls up the ever troublesome
duty of determimng right and wrong. How shall such a deter-
mination be made? Wilson proposed that the determination be
made by the peoplels power of moral perception (conscience) and
by the use of reason which serves "to ascertain the exactness, and
to discover and correct the mistakes, of the moral sense." These
human powers are to be aided by divine revelation. By diligent
application of these three tools the universal law of nature is
found.45
That talismanic idea of the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
a state of nature, is found in Wilson. But he was not one to sub-
scribe to what the idealistic Rousseau had to say about a state of
nature. It seems to have been a characteristic of Ar. justice Wilson
to attempt to trace a fundamental principle to the place of its first
statement.46 VWhen he looked upon a state of nature, it was through
the-eyes of Aristotle rather than through the eyes of Rousseau, he
42Have we not in essence the idea of an hierarchy of precepts wherein
"principles" dominate "rules" (in the narrower sense) See for the full
development of this idea of a hierarchy of legal precepts as 1. Rules (in
the narrower sense), 2. Principles, 3. Concepts, 4. Doctrines and 5. Stand-
ards, Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law
(1933) 7 Tulane L. Rev. 475, 482-486. In his Introduction to the Philosophy
ot Law (1920) Pound had offered but four stages in the hierarchy. "I.
Rules, 2. Principles, 3. Concepts, and 4. Standards" pp. 115-120.
431 Wilson Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) 159-160.
442 Works (Bird Wilson ed. 1804) 456-475. Blackstone's iiconsistencies
are attacked in 1 Hammond, Blackstone (1890) 111-117 (Editor's notes)
and Andrews, American Law (1900) 46, note 1.
451 Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) 125.
46Ibid. xi (Editor's preface).
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would have us learn the law of Nature from man in his most
perfect, not in his savage state. In many respects Wilson's thought
was far in advance of any of his contemporaries and his view that
society is natural and that there existed no state of nature which
antedated society is illustrative of that fact.
Since Stammler and Saleilles we have heard much about na-
tural law with a changing content.4 1 Wilson seems -to have been
grasping at some such idea when he pointed out that though the
laws of nature are immutable, that need not mean that man's
interpretation of them must remain ever fixed. Indeed, man's
interpretation will change with the progress of his knowledge'
"It is the glorious destiny of many to be progressive.. . Our
progress in virtue should certainly bear a just proportion to our
progress in knowledge. Morals are undoubtedly capable of being
carried to a much higher degree of excellence than the sciences,
excellent as they are. Hence, we may infer, that the law of nature,
though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its
operations and effects. Indeed, the same immutable principles will
direct this progression. In every period of its existence, the law,
which the divine wisdom has approved for man, will not only be
fitted to the contemporary degree but will be calculated to produce,
in future, a still higher degree of perfection. '48
He seems to have realized that in the direction of natural law with
a changing content lay the great contribution of natural law to the
future for he concludes with a statement containing a hope
"From what has been said concerning it, (the law of nature),
the most finished performance executed by human hands cannot
be perfect. But most of them have been rude and imperfect to a
very unnecessary, some, to a shameful degree.
"A more perfect work than his yet appeared upon this great
subject, -would be a most valuable present to mankind. Even the
most general outlines of it cannot, at least in these lectures, be
expected from me." 49
To all who know the story of the American Revolution, it is a
commonplace to assert that natural law-rights political theory was
47Stammler, Wirtschaft und Recht nach der Materialistischen Geschichts-
aufassung (ed. 1896) Sec. 23. Title: Ein Naturrecht mit emcem wcsch-
selnden Inhalte (Changed in edition of 1906 to Die Moglichheit crees ob-
jective richtigen Rechtsinhaltes, Stammler, Die Lehrt von dem Richtigcn
Rechte (Trasl. Husik as The Theory of Justice), Chapter III, Salleilles,
Ecole Historique et Droit Naturel (1902) 1 Revue Trimestrielle du Droit
Civil 96ff. See also Sabine, Rudolf Stammler's Critical Philosophy of Law
(1933) 18 Cornell L. Quar. 311-330. Drake, Juristic Idealism and Legal
Practice (1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 571-572, Pound, Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence (1911) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 154-159, 160. A brief
statement concerning Stammler's place in the history of juristic thought by
G. H. Robinson prefaces Sabine's paper (1933) 18 Cornell L. Quar. 321,
481 Wilson, Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) 127
49Ibid.
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translated into the most effective kind of political action. When,
however, one turns to the more strictly legal writing one is likely
to find the lawxyer employing the philosophical natural law termi-
nology out of mere polite deference to the current political and
legal theory. Thus it may be truly said of Blackstone that he talks
the language of natural law (though not with thoroughgoing con-
sistency) but when he. grapples with a legal problem his technique
is now that of the analytical jurist, now that of the historical jurist.
Not so with Wilson, however. For him natural law was a theory
to be actively employed in solving problems, it had utility-exactly
the virtue modern day proponents of natural law with a changing
content claim for it. He- flatly disagrees with the theory that man
surrenders in trust all his natural rights upon coming into civil
society so that thereby he may obtain the blessings of civil
liberty. Wilson maintains that when man comes into a politically
organized society, his rights are increased and made more secure.
So looking successively at various fields of law such as those
regulating property, character, liberty and security, he finds one
pivotal problem, the application of principles of natural law to
specific questions of human relationships and behavior."0 In the
field of criminal law this leads Wilson to discuss possibilities of
individualization of punishment far in advance of his day. He is
much interested in the work of Beccaria, in no uncertain terms he
announces that the criminal law in England stands greatly in need
of reformation." We have often spoken of the early American period
as the day of the natural law jurist-it was such without a doubt,
but it was anything but the exclusive day of the natural lawr jurist.
If James Wilson was a natural law jurist, he was an historical
jurist as well. The essence of the historical dogma is that law is
popular custom. That theory is found fully stated in Wilson's
writing. It found hearty acceptance, apparently, because Wilson
presented it in such a manner as to ground law in the most direct
manner upon popular consent. 2 Sovereignty Wilson still looks
upon as the attribute of a personal monarch, but of custom, we
find this
"Of all yet suggested, the mode for the promulgation of human
law by custom seems the most effectual. It involves in it internal
evidence, of the strongest kind, that the law has been introduced by
502 Wilson, Works (Bird Wilson ed. 1804) 466.
512 Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) Pt. 3, Ch. 1., esp. 346-347
52For the Roman origins of the theory that law is custom see Dickinson,
The Law Behind Law (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 113-127
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common consent, and that this consent rests upon the most solid
basis of experience as well as opinions.!' "
and this
"In the introduction, in the extension, in the continuance of cus-
tomary law, we find the operations of consent universally pre-
dominant." 54
It has been suggested that while the customary theory of law paid
tribute to the prevalent doctrine of "popular sovereignty" it did
so in a way which was acceptable to lawyers who feared the
possible excesses of democratic legislatures.? This had the effect
of minimizing, the conscious volitional element in law, it paved
the way for hostility to conscious law-making through an appeal
from the temporary legislative will of the people to their funda-
mental will as embodied in traditional institutions. By this unique
transformation as found in Wilson, America -was given what Dean
Pound has referred to as "natural law upon historical premises."10
To Wilson, custom is not merely the raw material out of which
legal rules are made, but rather, custom is regarded as fully
formulated law ready for application as a rule of decision before
it ever comes into the hatids of a court. It is quite as specific as
any rule which a court might itself lay down. To put it otherwise,
Wilson's argument is that judges do not make law, they merely
find it. 7
Four years after Wilson's debut in Philadelphia (1794) a young
Federalist politician, James Kent, began his lectures at Columbia.
In 1798, his work as a teacher was interrupted by his career on
the bench, in 1824, he resumed his teaching, which continued until
he tired of his labors and devoted himself to his famous Com-
mentaries.58 Kent's Commentaries constituted the first systematic
treatise upon American law The work stands as an independent
composition, though conceived in the spirit of Blackstone, in con-
531 Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) 57
54Ibid. 89.55Dickinson, The Law Behind Law (1929) 29 Col. L, Rev. 113, 1275(6The Scope and Purpose of Sociological jurisprudence (1911) 24
Harv. L. Rev. 591, 60ff, Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 Ideni,
383, 402.
571 Works (Andrews' ed. 1896) With this compare The Ideal and the
Actual Law (1890) 24 Am. L. Rev. 752, 760. On the views of Carter see
Pound, The Ideal and Actual in Law and Forty Years After (1933) 1 Geo.
Washington L. Rev. 431.58The first edition of Kent's Commentaries appeared in four successive
volumes between 1826 and 1830. Wm; Kent. Memoirs and Letters of James
Kent (1898) 193-5, History of Columbia University 1754-1904, 64, 78, 91,
92, 335ff.
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trast to the mere adaption of Blackstone's Commentaries which St.
George Tucker gave us.59
Chancellor Kent began his "Commentaries" with a comprehen-
sive survey of the Law of Nations which he correctly considers as
a part of the Common Law,00 and therefore a part of our law. Re-
garding "the faithful observance" of the Law of Nations as "essen-
tal to national character, and to the happiness of mankind," he
prefaced his work by a careful outline of International Law.L This
compact treatise constitutes the first scientific treatment of the
subject in the English language.
Kent, like his fellow jurist, was a staunch devotee of the
concept of natural law. Public law, particularly international law%,,
is inextricably bound up with ethics.0 2 He gloried in the opinion
of Lord Coke in Dr Bonham's Case in declaring that acts of
Parliament contrary to reason and equity, are void though at the
same time admitting that Blackstone's remark concerning the
omnipotence of Parliament was sound legal doctrine in England. 3
In the United States all legislation at variance with the true intent
of our constitutional system is void. However, Kent's is a par-
ticularly individualistic interpretation of the theory of natural'
rights. This is, perhaps, nowhere better evidenced than in hi dis-
cussion of the rights of persons. These rights he holds to be
"Either absolute, being such as belong to individuals in a single,
unconnected state, or relative, being those which arise from the
civil and domestic relations."04
Now these rights which he denominates "absolute" lie classifies
into
"the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and
the right to acqiire and enjoy property. These rights have been
justly considered, and frequently declared, by the people of.fhis
-country, to be Natural, inherent, and inalienable."
The bill of rights is hailed by Kent as the "muniments of Freemen"
and as the best testimonial "of the deep and universal sense of the
59That is, Kent wvas the first to cover so great a field. A similar work
confined to the law of a single state had been written by Zephaniah Swift,
The System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut. (1795).
6OTriquet v. Bath, 3 Burrow's Repts. 1478 (1764) Heathfield v. Chilton,
4 Burrow's Repts. 2115 (1767).
O1It is worthy of note that with the years Kent's appreciation of the
importance of the Law of Nations grew upon him. Thus in his Dissertation
(1795) he closed the work with a sketch of International Law while the
Commentaries (1826) are begun with a prominent treatment of the subject.
James Brown Scott, James Kent in 2 Lewis, Great American Lawyers
(1907) 491, 524.2Kent, Commentaries (Holmes' 12th ed. 1873) llff.63Ibid. 449.
c2 Kent, Commentri: , (Holmes' ed. 1873'1.
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value of our Natural rights."6 His handling of natural rights con-
cepts is best illustrated by his treatment of specific rights. In deal-
ing with the right of self-defense he tells us that there are certain
cases in which this right may be justly invoked and in such in-
stances the law of nature is not to be superseded by the law of
society66 He views most of the rights of individuals in their
domestic relations as having their origin in the law of nature.07
The right of revolution is stated to be a natural right "founded on
the law of nature and the reason of mankind, and supported by the
soundest authority, and by some very illustrious precedents."0 8
Now the significant idea in that statement is that sound authorities
and illustrious precedents are not the source of the right, they do
but confirm it-it is the difference between the philosophical jurist
and the historical jurist.
It has been suggested that our Constitution was designed pri-
marily for the protection of vested rights in property 60 In some-
thing of that spirit, we find the Commentaries stating that the
laws of nature extend their protection to the property of indi-
viduals. A law attempting to divest title to property lawfully
procured is void unless attended by the securities prescribed by the
principles of natural equity--and so the law and procedure of our
concept of eminent domain is identified as an "acknowledged prin-
ciple of universal law ,
It was Story -who most , effectively pointed out the great dis-
tinguishing contributions of Chancellor Kent in these words.
" equity was scarcely felt in the general administration of
justice, until about the period 'of the Reports of Cames and of
Johnson. And, perhaps, it is not too much to say, that it did not
attain its full maturity and masculine vigor, until Mr. Chancellor
Kent, brought to it the fulness of his own extraordinary learning,
unconquerable diligence, and brilliant talents.""
Now the significant quality of Kent's equity i's that it was not
merely the equity of a disciplined and well-stocked mind whose
mainspring was a love of abstract justice applied to the concrete
case, but rather it was the equity of English Chancery adapted to
the needs of Kent's own time and place. 72 Upon ascending the
(52 Kent, Commentaries (Holmes' ed. 1873) 4, 8.
r(;Ibid. 15.
67Ibid. 39.
682 Kent Commentaries (Holmes' ed. 1873) 209.
69Argument of Mr. Choate in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co.
(Income Tax cases) 157 U. S. 429, 534, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 759 (1894).
702 Kent, Commentaries (Holmes' ed. 1873) 339.73Story, Equity Jurisprudence (13th ed. 1887) sec. 56, p. 53.
72Kent's opinions in equity are to be found in the seven volumes of John-
son's Chancery Reports.
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Chancery bench, the new Chancellor found the ancient tenor of
the common law greatly modified by statutes of the New York
legislature and the new Constitution. This being true, it was Kent's
particularprovince to apply the principles of equity to these changes
and of necessity his opinions were somewhat detailed and written
rather in the style of the commentator than in that of the judge.
As a judicial craftsman he seemed bent upon placing the first
series of American Equity Reports on foundations deeply and
strongly laid. Though admitting the binding character of pre-
cedents in English Chancery, " he had a characteristic historical-
mindedness74 which drove him to verify the original sources from
which Lord Somers or Lord Hardwicke had drawn. He -was not
one to attribute to Somers that which was due to Ulpian oi'
Paulus7 3
It seems in point here to note that Chancellor Kent had some-
thing to say about the nature of the judicial process in so far as his
own technique was concerned. Writing to Thomas Washington
in 1828, he said.
"My practice was, first, to make myself perfectly and accurately
(mathematically accurately) master of the facts. It was done by
abridging the bill. and then the answers, and then the depositions,
and, by the time I had' done this slow and tedious process, I was
master of the cause and ready to decide it. I saw where justice
lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; and then
I sat down to search the authorities until I had examined my
-books. I might bnce in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule,
but I most always found principles suited to my views of the case.
my object was to discuss a point so as never to be teased with it
again, and to anticipate an angry and vexatious appeal to a popu-
lar tribunal by disappointed counsel."7' 0
- Now -when Kent referred to himself as an examiner of books,
he meant not only the books of English authority, but the books
of the Dutch, French, Swiss and German publicists as well. We
have noted that in.the field of political theory American thinkers
had abundant precedents for employing the comparative method.
7 3Manning v. Ianning's Exrs. 1 Johnson's Chanc. (N. Y.) 527
74"Historical-mindedness is so much a preconception of modern thought
that we can identify a particular thing only by pointing to the various things
it successively was before it became that particular thing which it will pres-
ently cease to be." Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Cen-
tury Philosophers (1932) 19.
7SFowler, Observations on the Particular Jurisprudence of New York
(1881) 25 Alb. L. J. 285, 288.6 VNrm. Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent 158-159. See
Memoirs, 118, where Kent explains the need of his writing labored opinions
in order to beat down opposition, "or shame it by exhaustive research and
overwhelming authority."
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But to Kent and Story must go the distinction of first using com-
parative law as a tool for the decision of cases.7  An examination
of Chancellor Kent's opinions must reveal their author deriving
inspiration from the juridical writers of Europe during all ages.
There one finds citation to the classical writers upon the Roman law;
to the Dutch publicists, Grotius, Vinnius, Voet and Bynkershoek;
the German jurists, Puffendorf, Hemeccius and Strykius, the
French juridical writers, Domitt, D'Aguesseau, Fournel, Emeri-
gon, Pothier and Valin and to the Swiss, Burlamaqui and Vattel.
And this was no mere idle display of erudition on Kent's part.
He found a practical utility in the civil law during the time he
was shaping our equity Again, in a letter to Thomas Washington.
he confesses
"I could generally put my brethren to rout and carry my point by
my mysterious wand of French and Civil law. The judges were
Republicans and very kindly disposed to everything that was
French, and this enabled me, without exciting any alarm or
jealousy, to make free use of such authorities and thereby enrich
our commercial law "7
Story, like Kent, was a comparative law jurist and a learned
civilian. 70 When, however, one looks for the effects of this com-
parative method introduced into American juristic science by
Story and Kent, one finds few permanent results. 0 , Now while
the citation of civilian jurists abounds in the output of both men.
what seems more to the point is the fact that, when the ideas of
either of them differ from those of the civilians on issues newly
presented, both judges invariably inject their own idea into our
law in spite of the civilians. One must conclude that Kent and
Story were employing the comparative method only to build tip
the common law and not as a wedge to pry open the door so that
another system might ease its way in. Both men seem to have
realized that the examination of old problems and the discussion
77To the effect that the comparative method must necessarily enter into
the science of jurisprudence whether that science be analytical, historical or
philosophical, see Pound, Outline of Lectures on Jurisprudence (4th ed.
1928) On Comparative-Apologetic Schools see Isaac, The Schools of
Jurisprudence (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 373, 400.78Wm. Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent (1898) 117 In an-
other olace Kent says "We had but few American precedents. English
authority did not stand very high in those feverish times." Ibid. 118. See
Pound, The'Influence of French Law in America (1909) 3 Ill. L. Rev. 354.
7aSee Bright v. Boyd (1841) 1 Story's Repts. 478, Fed. Cas. No. 1875,
wherein nearly two-thirds of the authorities cited are civilians.
SOA few of the instances in which civil law rules have displaced the
common law rule are c'ted by Dean Pound, The Influence of French Law
in A-merica (1909) 3 Ill. L. Rev. 354-361.
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of new ones by a comparison of common-law and civil-law author-
ity must needs make for progress in our law.
Like Kent, Story affected the development of our law in three
ways, as judge, as writer and as teacher. But Story's service upon
the bench and his career as a teacher were more extended than
Kent's and, as a writer, the former was far more prolific. Kent, as
a pioneer, confined himself to an institutional book while Story
was to contribute model treatises (in someinstances the first in
their field) upon Conflict of Laws, Constitutional Law, Equity,
and Commercial Law It has been suggested that when Justice
Story took his seat upon the bench in the second decade of the
nneteenthsl century the work of receiving and adapting the coin-
mon law and of developing from it a system of American law
remained yet to be done and that the beginning of any real progress
in this work dated from the judicial appointments of Marshall and
Kent.S2
It is an obvious truth that the case-law of Justice Story con-
stitutes a record of achievement on the bench and yet it seems not
too ungracious to assert that the qualities of mind in which Story
excelled and which he most delighted to employ were those of the
teacher and the jurist and nof those of the judge. To a mind such
as Story's, eager to traverse the entire field of the law, the con-
fines of the judicial office, with its supposed limitation to proved
fact and established law, might well prove irksome. Such limitation
does not exist to the same degree in the career of the teacher and
the jurist. Comiig to the bench in the formative period of our
law's development, Story shared with Kent the task of shaping
equity to an American environment. In Admiralty and Prize his
opportunities were not unlike those of Lord Stowell and his con-
tribution in commercial law may be likened to that of Lord
,AMansfield.
To the student of the judicial process, Story too is an interest-
ing study. He was quite idealistic and this tendency to idealize,
and at times to reform, und rnned his practical soundness as a
judge. For instance, he suggested that a court of equity might
quite properly decree specific performance of all bona fide con-
siStory was appointed to the Supreme Court of the United Sttes by
President Madison in 1811.
s"Pound, The Place of Judge Story in tile Making of Americnn Lw
(1914) 48 Am. L. Rev. 676, 682-3, (1916) 1 Mass. L. Q. 121. John .Marshall
was appointed Chief Justice of tile Supreme Court of the United States by
President Jefferson in 1801, while James Kent was made Chancellor in
New York in 1814.
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tracts.s3 Again, .i his judicial opinions, one may discern the same
mental tendency In Martin v. Hituter's Lessee"4 the doctrine that
the whole of the Federal judicial power should be at all tines
vested in courts created under Federal authority is advanced.
Closely allied to his tendency to idealize is his adherence to the
concept of natural law Acting under its influence in La Joune
Eugente,s5 he held that the slave trade was contrary to natural
justice and moral duty and so violative of the law of nations.
Since both Kent and Story were crusaders for a broad equity, a
description of the latter's method of deciding cases by one who
knew~him well should be contrasted to Chancellor Kent's descrip-
tion of his own judicial behavior quoted above. Of Story, his
colleague at Harvard, Simon Greenleaf, said
"It was his habit, after hearing an argument, in cases of um-
portance to defer the investigation of the matter until his mind
had cooled after the excitement of the hearing, and freed itself of
all bias produced by the high colorings of the eloquence of Ils
appeals, leaving in their memory only the impressions made by
the principal facts and the legal reasonings, of which he also took
full notes. After this, he carefully examined all the cases cited
and others bearing on the subject, reviewing aid fixing firmly
in his mind all the principles of law which might govern the case.
By the aid of these principles he proceeded to examine the ques-
tion upon its merits, and to decide accordingly, always first estab-
lishing the law in his mind, lest the hardship of the ,case should
lead him to an illegal conclusion.""
In 1829 Nathan Dane of Dane's Abridgment fame founded a
professorship of law at Harvard for Joseph Story and in the
foundation provided that the holder of the professorship should
not only lecture, but should also "revise for publication." How
well Story carried out the mandate of the Dane Foundation needs
no arguing. The body of legal writing coming from Story's pen
has been likened in its importance to that of Coke.87 True it is that
8 3Story, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1846) par. 717a.
841 Wheat. 304, 4 L. Ed. 97 (1816).
s52 Mason's Repts. 409, Fed. Cas. 15551 (1822). In The Antelope, 10
Wheat. 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825) Marshall in considering the question fol-
lowed Lord Stowell in The Lewis, 2 Dodson's Repts. 210 (1817) saying,
"this court must not yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of
duty, and must obey the mandate of the law."8OGreenleaf, Discourse Commemorative of the Life and Character of
Hon. Joseph Story, LL.D. (1845) 44.87
"As Coke summed up the development prior to his time anl thus fur-
rushed the basis for a juristic new star, so these text writers (referring
mainly to Story) summed up English case law of the seventeenth century
and eighteenth century and made it available as the basis of a new start in
America," Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American
Law" (1914) 48 Am. L. Rev. 675, 692 (1916) 1 Mass. L. Quar. 121.
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Marshall in large part made our public law, but Story became its
great expounder to the bench and bar. One may trace the influ-
ence of his Commentaries on the Constitution' s through Cooley
into nearly all the texts of the last'part of the nineteenth century.
It may be doubted whether any treatise of more importance than
Story's Conflict of Law has ever emanated from American legal
scholarship. Dicey maintains that it "forthwith systematized, one
might say, created a whole branch of the law of England."80 But
from the standpoint of the upbuilding of our system of law, the
treatise upon Equity stands as Story's most significant contribu-
tion. In view of the traditional Puritan hostility to equity,00 it was
of supreme importance that equity be expounded to American
readers by a friendly commentator. Story did this in an extremely
readable fashion presenting English Equity as essentially Roman
law and a body of universal principles of justice. While Kent
was achieving equity upon the bench, Story, perceiving the im-
portance of equity in our system, contributed a book destined to
beat into submission the forces actively hostile to the extension of
equity.
Though perhaps better known to political scientists and stu-
dents of international law than to lawyers, Francis Lieber published
a book of peculiar significance to the student of jurisprudence. This
was his Legal and Political Heremeneutics or Principles of Inter-
pretation and Construction in Law and Politics with Remarks on
Precedents and Authorities, the first edition of which appeared in
1839 9' It -seems to have been the first attempt to put the science
of heremeneutics into operation in the field of Jurisprudence. Here-
tofore it had been confined to the province of theology in England
and America, as the theory upon which the practice of exegesis
proceeded. In his discussion of the problems inherent in the process
of legal interpretation and construction, Lieber shows genmne
awareness of the weakness of rigid codification.' -
Among our juristic thinkers are illustrious men who have pro-
posed to save the law from its vagaries by word cures-devices
8SThe first edition of the Commentaries appeared in 1833.
soDicey, Conflict of Laws (5th ed. 1932) 931. The first edition of
Story's Conflict of Laws appeared in 1834.
soPound, The Spirit .of the Common Law (1921) 53-54.
9IThis work was an expansion of two articles, On Political Heremeneu-
tics, or on Political Interpretation and Construction. and also on Precedents
(1837-1838) 18 Amer. Jurist and Law Mag. 37, 381. The volume is dedi-
cated to James Kent. For a biographical sketch of Lieber see Nys, Francis
Lieber-His Life and His Work (1911) 5 A. J. I. L. 84, 355.9-Legal and Political Hermeneutics (Hammond's 3rd ed. 1880) 155.
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either in the nature of fool-proof schemes of legal analysis,
heremeneutics, or a science of "nomo-thetics.'Da
When first examining Lieber's Heremeneutics one is tempted
to mark the author as a mere logomach, his theory of interpreta-
tion seems to consist in nothing more than the examination of the
meanings of words by the dictionary process. His principles gov-
erning interpretation and construction, however, are valuable even
today as a guide to ordered thinking on the part of those who
have to do with legislation, whether as legislator or judge. Implicit
in Lieber's theory is the ideal often proposed by Dean Pound for
the effective Code,9 4 as contrasted to the doctrine of utter futility
in codification so often voiced by Carter. Says Lieber
"It has been shown that it is impossible to word laws in such
a manner as to absolutely exclude all doubt, or to allow us to
dispense with construction, even if they be worded for the time for
which they were made with absolute (mathematical) distinctness;
because things and relations change, and because interests conflict
differently with each other at different times. The very object of
general laws is to establish general rules beforehand, for if %ve
would attempt to settle each case according to the views which,
with the momentary interest, it might itself suggest, we should
establish at once the most insufferable tyranny or anarchy By this
inherent generality, however, there is a constant reason for re-
quiring construction in the application of laws, since most cases
occurring are of a complex character. It is in vain, therefore, to be-
lieve in the possibility of forming a code of laws absolutely distinct,
like mathematical theories." '
In Lieber's writing is also a redefinition of sovereignty which
seems clearly a prophecy of the approaching ascendance of the
historical school in American juristic thought, sounding, as it
does in the Nationalist-Geist philosophy of the GermansY Accord-
ing to Lieber, sovereignty is the vital principle of the state, resting
upon a contract entered into by the people but springing from the
93For examples of rigid analysis and logomachian jurists (who seem
to derive their inspiration from the ancient glossators) see Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1923)
23, 65 reprinted from (1933) 23 Yale L. J. 16 and (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 710;
Kocourek (1928) Jural Relations Kocourek (1930) An Introduction to the
Science of Law, especially Chap. IV, Wigmore, Introduction to Kocourek's
Jural Relations (1928) and Wigmore, The Terminology of Legal Science
(with a Plea for the Science of Nomo-Thetics) (1914) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 1.94Writing of a model practice act, Pound says that it "should deal
with the general lines to be followed, leaving details to be fixed by rules of
court, which the courts may change from time to time as actual experience
of the application and operation dictates." Some Principles of Procedural
Reform (1910) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388, 403.
95Legal and Political Heremeneutics (Hammond's ed. 1880) 154-155.
91See Thilly, History of Philosophy (1914) 475 (On Hegel)
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organic unity of a homogeneous population united by a common
tradition and inhabiting a common territory The manifestation of
sovereignty is to be found in public opinion which itself is "the
continued sovereign action of society." In more familiar terms this
is only a somewhat labored statement of the principles of majority
rule as reflected in the constitutional arguments of Daniel Web-
ster.97
Though an exponent of natural law, Lieber saw certain short-
comings in the blind acceptance of such theories in the light of the
historical attitude toward which he seems to be inclining. To him
natural law was a body of principles from which to begin to build
a science of law and politics. Natural law principles were to serve
as guides, not dogas-they had a flexibility which yielded to
certain conditioning factors which historical jurists were beginning
to insist upon.
"On the one hand, men have seen that, without establishing
firm and absolute principles, all would be confusion and insecurity.
On the other hand, they have been so far misled by principles
drawn from natural law, as to judge every political question by
theory alone, disavowing experience, expedience, and a due regard
to the elements which were given wherewith to work."'95
In his later writings, Lieber drops the concept of natural or primor-
dial rights altogether. Thbugh he does not expressly repudiate the
concept of natural law, he flatly ignores it and in its stead we find
"Anglical liberties," used to designate those rights secured by the
common law, statute and constitution.9
Perhaps no book exercised a greater influence upon the de-
velopment of American Constitutional law after the Civil War
than Thomas McIntyre Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (1868).
In this work as well as in his edition of Blackstone, the influence of
the theory of natural rights is everywhere apparent. In dealing
with the bills of rights he says"
"we must not commit the mistake of supposing that, because indi-
vidual rights are guarded and protected by them they must also
be considered as owing their origin to them. These instruments
measure the rights of the rulers, but do not measure the rights of
the governed."'x°0
In his edition of Blackstone he interprets the American bill of
rights on the basis of Blackstone's theory of the absolute rights of
973 Webster, Works 320-341.9 8Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics (Woolsey's 2nd ed. 1875) 71.
99Lieber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government (1853).
lOOCooley, Constitutional Limitations (2nd ed. 1871) 36.
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individuals.'" Of greatest importance, perhaps, is his argument
that certain rights, particularly rights of property, are so essential
that they should receive the protection of the courts though they
find no specific provision in bills of rights.102 Cooley knew enough
history' 0 3 to have little if'any regard for rights said to belong to
one in a state of nature and apart from society The supposition
of any such state he held to be "useless even as a matter of
theory 1104
Cooley preacthed with much eloquence certain constitutional
and juristic dogmas, which have since become storm centers in
American juristic thought. In the first place, he was a most de-
termined champion of the doctrine of the separation of powers in
all its pristine purity To him a constitution was simply a limitation
. on the power of the legislature and he was loath to admit any in-
plied limitations.105 He also had some very positive opinions as to
the degree of certainty or uncertainty to be found in the law In
the light of recent pronouncements upon the question, some indi-
cating a "here-the-law-is-certain, here-it-isn't" attitude 00 and
some indicating an "it's-all-uncertain" attitude, 07 this confident
statement by Cooley is of interest
"It is not, true in any sense that the law is uncertain, it is in fact
so far from being true that, on the contrary, the law will be found
on investigation to have more of the elements of certainty about
it, and to be more worthy of trust than anything else, even in
lOlCooley observes that "absolute rights" or "natural rights" are few
and simple while "relative rights" are far more numerous and complicated
and that these "relative rights" are constantly on the increase. 1 Cooley,
Blackstone (1884) 124, note 4.
lOlConstitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 356.
'O3Cooley could lay claim to being something of an historian. In 1885
he published his History of Michigan as one of the then popular American
Commonwealth Series.
lO4People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 322, 4 Am. Repts. 400 (1870).
1OiConstitutional Limitations (lst ed. 1868) 88. See also Knowlton,
Thomas McIntyre Cooley (1907) 5 Mich. L. Rev. 309, 317 1
10OPound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1925) 139-143.
The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 802-825, Law
and Morals (2nd ed. 1926) 58, 72, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence
(1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 707-7-8, Dickinson, Legal Rules and Their
Function in the Process of Decision 79 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 833, 835ff.
1OIFrank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930). The whole book pro-
ceeds upon the theme that the attainment of certainty in the law is "the
basic legal myth," but see especially Chaps. I, IV. Part One and Chap. I,
Part II, also Appendix iv Notes on Pound's Views 289-295, Llewellyi,
A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 431;
Some Realism About Realism (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1236. See also
Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation? (1929) 77 Uiv. Pa.
L. Rev. 601, 628.
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physical nature, or in the realm of mind or of morals, that concerns
to the same extent the every-day life of mankind.1 0 S
To Cooley it was conceivable that law which was uncertain might
m a degree be better than no law but he held that it could not
possibly foster a condition of confident security and peace. Cooley's
arguments tending to exalt certainty as the great distinguishing
charactenstic of our laws were chiefly drawn from Federal con-
stitutional lkw. This fact itself would seem to weaken his argu-
ment, in that it excluded the peculiarly grave American problems
of diversity bred of a large number of separate and distinct states.
To Cooley the uncertain does not mean simply the not clearly pre-
dictable, to him "uncertain" means "difficult to understand" and
"untrustworthy."'0 ° He argues eloquently for the need of certainty
in the law governing commercial transactions and he tells us that
there is a legal rule for every case, and that though the rules may
seem technical, exact compliance is requisite and that "the perils of
non-compliance are often very great."' 10 In the law of real property
he saw an equal need for certainty, nor had he any doubt of the fixed
character of the law of family relations, nor of the desirability of that
fixity." :' Strange it is for us to accost the observation that "the un-
certainty of the law is most apparent when the estates of deceased
persons come to be judicially settled up."' '
The law vwhich Judge Cooley found so pleasingly certain is the
law of a purist-something beautiful in the clarity of its delineation
IosCooley, The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga. Bar Assn.
109-110.
109"difficult to understand. But if we were to begin our observations
with preconceived notions that the law governing bankIng operations was
difficult to understand and uncertain, we should probably be astonished by
the clock-like regularity of all transactions, and by the evident rarity of
occasions when the cashier or other officers would deem it necessary to
delay to take counsel." The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga.
Bar Assn. 109, 117 "Untrustworthy- How thoughtless, and how baseless
-and unwarranted are all statements, utterances or insinuations, fron what-
ever source coming or in whatever form, which imply that the law, spoken
of collectively, is uncertain or untrustworthy. " Ibid. 121.
" The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga. Bar Assn. 109, 117
"The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga. Bar Assn. 109, 116.
Here then seem to be the three conceptions of certainty zones in the law.
(1) Cooley- The entire area of the substantive law is certain (2) Pound:
Certainty is desirable in the fields of property and commercial law while
discretion is desirable in the field of personal relations (3) Frank: Llewellyn:
The quest for the certainty in the law is the quest of an illusion whether that
quest be pursued in the fields of property, commercial law or personal re-
lations.
"'2This unsatisfactory degree of uncertainty in testamentary law Cooley
explains in part by the temptation of the parties "to engage in litigation on a
mere chance that in some way not clearly perceived they may succeed in
what they desire!" The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga. Bar
Assn. 109, 120.
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but sometimes decidedly unreal. His law had no factual content
other than the fact of the rule itself. Fact and law were things dis-
tinct and the former was no part of the latter. If law seems uncertain
it is only because of uncertainty as to the view that will be taken of
the facts-that kind of uncertainty can never be cured by perfecting
the law for it inheres in the finite character of human understanding.
Since Cooley's law is pure law, we find him arguing that law and the
administration of law are two different things and one is not to be
blamed for the sins of the other.
"Having said this much concerning law in the abstract, and con-
cerning its silent and unobtrusive benefactions, we shall not shrink
from a consideration of the law as it manifests itself in its admin-
istration. Here we shall admit, as indeed we have clone already, that
doubts, difficulties and uncertainties come in, and that sometimes the
instrumentalities of the law become the subject of just reproach. It
does not follow, however that the law itself is subject to re-
proach."'113
But if Cooley talks the language of natural rights, he talks the
custom-worship of the historical jurist with equally great con-
viction. With whole-hearted approval, he quotes the proverb.
"With customs we do well, but statutes may undo us" and adds
that our laws are still for the most part customary and are likely
to continue so. There is a Savignian Geist in Cooley's conception
of the nature of law "Law," he avows, "is something more than
a collection of rules." By "more than," however, Cooley does not
mean to include anything non-legally factual, whether these be
economic facts or the facts of law administration. The "more
than" of his concept of law is indefinable spirit with the suggestion
of Nationalism which custom invariably dictates
"Law is something more than a collection of rules. Those
who expect to find somewhere all the law in black and white, fail
to grasp its divine significance. Tongue has never formulated it
completely, pen has never fully written it down. Law is expressed
in statutes and in decisions, but as the anatomy is not all of the man.
so these are not all the law, there is a vital force which is more
than words, and which, if the words were all blotted out, would
still hold the units of society together and in order, while the words
were being reproduced.""11 4
With the development of civilization, we are told, customary laws
and the laws of nature tend to approximate each other as legal
rules. Though many of them may have been conventional in
origin, when long observed they create a reason for themselves and
"13The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga. Bar Assn. 109, 122.
"14The Uncertainty of the Law (1887) 4 Repts. Ga. Bar Assn. 109, 126.
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the citizen conforms to them without question as he does to the
laws of nature whose operation he perceives about him.
No one could demonstrate better than Cooley the inseparabil-
ity of the several Schools of Jurisprudence, one from the other.
III.
COOLEY TO OUR CONTEMPORARIES
At the very heart of contemporary writing in the field of
Jurisprudence is the problem of law reform. It seems always to
have been so. Few indeed could or would approach the severely
pure anatomical Jurisprudence of John Austin. We have seen that
philosophy (natural law) tempered the views of so many whom we
have chosen to label analytical or historical jurists.
No more significant warfare has ever been waged in the history
of American juristic thought than the bitter warfare between
codification and custom which ranged over the second half of the
nineteenth century. The codificationists took their commands from
David Dudley Field who found the beginnings of the common law
in the code of Alfred.115 Of course Field defines law as a com-
mand and he insists upon a distinction between law and jurispru-
dence.
"Though law and jurisprudence are not convertible terms,
they are often used in the same sense. The latter is the science,
which treats of the law and explains it, the former is the fornu-
lated precept."'""
The practical utility of the study of Jurisprudence, according
to Field, was that study might guide the sorely needed efforts to
,reform the law. In his zeal for reform, Field has long been likened
to Bentham. Field clearly recognized the difficulty in arousing the
members of the legal profession to the needs of reform, but he in-
sisted that a lawyer has more than a duty to advise his clients
aright and to deal with the courts. When the lawyer finds laws
imperfect or unjust, he, as the one who best knows the laws and
knows best how to improve them, ought to make his .knowledge
available for the public good. In short, the lawyer he conceived to
be a man with a mission and that mission was law reform. In
pointing the direction which reform should take, he thought nothing
quite so valuable as the example of others and so he placed a de-
115Field, Address at the Dalhousie University Convocation, April 29,
1885, 19 Am. L. Rev. 616, 617
116Dalhousie Convocation Address (1885) 19 Am. L. Rev. 616, 617
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cided emphasis upon the comparative method which he dignified
by the term "comparative jurisprudence."
As the ideals to be sought after in the reform of Anglo-Amer-
ican law, Field set up three condensation, simplicity and uni-
formity He stoutly maintained that condensation would be at-
tained only through codification. He did not see that rigid codes
would never prevent the "multiplication of details" against which
he arrayed himself. The first step in the problem of simplification
he thought involved a realistic break with historical differences,
distinctions and technicalities when present conditions no longer
warranted obeisance to these ghosts of the past.117 As to uniformity,
he found it to be the crying need of a world no longer constituted
of so many isolated communities, of a -world committed to the
policy of intercourse rather than to the policy of isolation. Con-
densation, simplicity, uniformity-these were the ideals to be sought
after in a legal system and the means for attaining any and all of
them was codification. Though Field did not include the attain-
ment of certainty in his statement of the aims of his reform pro-
gram-the attainment of certainty in the law and in its adnimstra-
tion is clearly implicit in all of'his labors.
That he translated his statement of aims and ideals into stern
practice is, of course, a matter of common knowledge. He was hin-
self the great maker of codes, the manufacturer of certainty Thus
he codified not only the law and practice of American states, but lie
bent his efforts to the formulation of an International Codel"8 and
insisted upon arbitration as the method of procedure for enforce-
ment before resort should be had to arms. He would today, per-
haps, find himself holding much in common with the idealistic
School of International Law
"In some happier age, under some more benignant star, there
will yet, we would fain believe, be established among men a great
Amphictyonic council of the nations with a -wider sway than the
Council of Greece, to which the nations will submit, as individuals
now submit, with unfaltering deference, to a court of honor."'1 0
More familiar than his effort in behalf of an International
Code is the imposing array of Codes covering the substance and
"
1 7Field singled out, as particularly unnecessary variations and distine-
tions, the law with respect to the effect given to sealed instruments and the
1'w treating of the difference between real and personal property in respect
of its devolution upon the owner's death. Dalhousie Convocation Address(1885) 19 Am. L. Rev. 616.
llSField, Outline of an International Code (1872) (2nd ed. 1876).119Quoted by S. Netton Fiero, David Dudley Field and His Work(1895) 18 Rept. N. Y. St. Bar Assn. 177, 181. See also 1 Field's Speeches,
Arguments. Miscellaneous Papers (Ed. Sprague 1884-90) 426, 481.
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procedure of the law of New York, including a Penal Code, a
Code of Criminal Procedure, a Civil Code, a Political Code, a
Code of Evidence and a Code of Civil Procedure. None but the
most faithful believer in a command theory of law could ever have
spent a life in an effort of that kind.
One finds the most complete development-of the theory of law
as custom in the writings of James Coolidge Carter. In the midst
of his busy life at the bar, Carter found time to assume the supreme
command of the forces which defeated the adoption of the Field
Civil Code in New York. This long struggle equipped him ad-
mirably for juristic controversy. To Carter the one striking char-
acteristic of the development of private law was the very small
influence of legislation . 2 0 That evidence led hin to assert that law
is found and not made. The judicial process lie characterized as a
search, in which both judge and advocates join, to discover the
applicable rule of law.' 2' The unvritten law is not regarded as
a command but rather as a rule springing from the social standard
of justice. or from customs and habits from which that standard
has in turn been derived.12 2
The sine qua non of formal law is a judiciary and so the first
step in the transformation of custom into formal law is the creation
of judges. Now Carter believed that, though formal law does not
at first exist, the law itself exists or there would be no occasion to
appoint a judge to administer it. The explanation Nwas all quite
simple to Carter-le found one constant factor, human nature, and
while that factor continued constant, law must always remain cus-
tom. He put it thus
"The social standard of justice exists in the habits, customs
and thoughts of the people, and all that is needed in order to apply
it to the simpler affairs of such a period is the selection of a person
for a judge who best comprehends those habits, customs and
thoughts .1 1 2-3
Carter could hardly fail to be impressed by the unammity with
which early American jurists rejected the theory that law is neces-
sarily the command of a superior and this seems equally true of
his contemporary, William G. Hammond. Hammond avowed "that
"-oCarter, Law- Its Origin, Growth and Function (1907) 118.1-1Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law (1890) 24 An. L. Rev.
552ff. Cf. Pound, The Ideal and the Actual in Law-Forty Years After.
(1930) 1 Geo. Washington L. Rev. 431.
" -Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law (1890) 24 Am. L. Rev.
752, 759.
"-'3The Ideal and the Actual in the Law (1890) 24 Am. L. Rev. 752,
759. See-also Carter, Law- Origin, Growth and Function (1907) 120.
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we have no sovereign in the juristic or in the political sense."' 24
But for all his disclaimer of the existence of a sovereign, it were
error to think, that Hammond regarded the origin of law in cus-
tom. Quite the opposite, "we find that the first trace of any recog-
nition of order and law in the world appears in the form of some
God or superior being."'125 Throughout his writing Hammond is
conscious of a higher law than that framed by men. How far from
Carter Hammond really is may be judged from this account of
customary law in primitive society
"The resemblance -between customary jural law and the. law of
nature or physical law is complete. Both are systems independent
of human will to 'be observed and followed if one would prosper.
One must plow and sow in a certain method if one would reap a
satisfactory harvest, one must govern his actions by that customary
law if he would not bring pestilence or disaster upon his fami!y or
his tribe. "126
The differentiation between physical and jural law I-tHmmond re-
garded as a later development which attained completeness only
with the rise of legislation.
Legal rules were deemed to have a natural existence compar-
able to that of the principles of physical science.12 7 The judge is
also a finder of law, rather than a maker thereof, his function be-
ing to record his observations of the principles of penal law which
are pre-existent in the natural order. The belief that principles
upon which cases of first impression have been decided are the
creation of judges is utterly unthinkable since it involved a denial
of a divine order in the moral constitution of this world. If Eng-
lish and American judges are themselves the authors of the law
which they expounded, we are forced to the admission that the
whole course of their jurisprudence has been an unjust government
of litigants under rules that did not exist when they entered into
the transaction before the tribunal.
"The new view, that they (the judges) were really making law
while they professed only to expound it, seems to me to rest en-
tirely upon the assumption that all law must necessarily be legis-
lation-a rule or rules promulgated beforoand in writing, by some
earthly sovereign whom the people are bound to obey The old
12 4Hammond's Blackstone (1890) (Editor's notes) There will be found
extensive quotations from the early American jurists.
1251 Hammond's Blackstone (1890) 96.
1261 Hammond's Blackstone (1890) 103.
127Foe a contemporary effort to establish a kind of kinship between the
methodology of legal sciences and the physical sciences, see W W Cook,
Modern Movements in Legal Education (1920) 6 Am. L. Rev. 409; Scientific
Method and the Law (1927) 13 A B. A. J. 303, 15 Johns Hopkins Alumni
Mag. No. 3.
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doctrine rested on the assumption that there were fixed principles
of jural as well as moral rights, which every man was bound to
obey, and which every magistrate was bound to recognize and en-
force to the best of his knowledge and ability."' -s
So it is that the higher law, to which the rules laid down by the
judges must conform, comprises those immutable principles which
control the universe. These include the eternal dictates of natural
justice, reason, or equity, which are operative in guiding human
conduct.
In 1894 appeared the lectures of John F Dillon under the
forbidding title The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and
America. These lectures reveal Dillon to be an analytical jurist
but certainly not of the same severe stripe as was Field. In dis-
cussing the nature of. law, true to the analytical pattern, he points
out that law and morality are quite distinct spheres and he did not
fall into the error of dismissing the question with that proposition
as so many analytical jurists had done, thereby leaving their
readers to draw the sad conclusion that our law has been built in
disregard of the principles of morality. Rather, he leans to a
Thomistic view of the relationship between law and morals:
"Theoretically, and for many purposes practically, lawyers must dis-
criminate law from morality, and define and keep separate and dis-
tinct their respective provinces. But these provinces always adjoin
each other and ethical considerations can no more be excluded
from the administration of justice, which is the end and purpose
of all civil laws, than one can exclude the vital air from his room
and live."' -9
And this close interrelation Judge Dillon found to be a matter of
considerable practicable importance in discussing the nature of the
judicial process. Dillon's description of'his own judicial behavior
is singularly remimscent of a like pronouncement by Kent.1'0
"If unblamed I may advert to my own experience, I always felt, in
the exercise of the judicial office, irresistibly drawn to the intrinsic
justice of the case, with the inclination, and if possible the de-
termination to rest the judgment upon the very right of the matter.
In the practice of this profession I always feel an abiding con-
fidence that if my case is morally right and just it will succeed,
whatever technical difficulties may appear to stand in the way;
and the result usually justifies the confidence."' 3 '
l2SHammond, Notes to his edition of Lieber's Legal and Political Here-
meneutics (1880) 328.
"-'9Dillon, Laws and jurisprudence of England and America (1894) 17.
"'Wim. Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent (1898) 158-159.
"3'Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America (1894) 17-18.
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Despite all this, however, he avows that the very essence of law is
its sanction, i.e. the coercion of the State.13 2
To the problem of law reform, Dillon also gave considerable
thought. He viewed with alarm both the bulk of our law (particu-
larly case law) and its uncertainty In trying to suggest the di-
rection which reform must take he prophesied the expansion of
legislative action. This he viewed as rather desirable since he be-
lieved the cause of certainty in the law would be promoted. On the
question of codification and its desirability, Dillon's thinking seems
to have been somewhat confused. He repudiated the Benthamite
idea of a code whereby all the minutiae of legal rules might be
embodied in a code to the end that the -welter of reported case law
might be superseded, but he championed the same rule of con-
struction of a code which was followed by so many men upon the
bench during his day, a notion which so thoroughly emasculated
the codes of procedure once they succeeded of enactment-this
was the rul that the code should be construed as an attempt to
embody the common law The same motive has prompted con-
struing statutes strictly when in derogation of the common law '
Under such a rule of construction, substantially all that the legis-
lature does *is speedily undone in the courts.
Dillon would admonish each and every judge that his task is
not to merely search the books and worship precedent but that,
first and foremost, he must hand down a just decision. All who
sit upon the bench he would charge with Dr. Johnson's observa-
tion-"no precedents can justify absurdity 114 Of the American
writers on Jurisprudence, it was probably Dillon who first gave us
an epigrammatic picture of law as an abiding paradox in that it
must be fixed and yet must progress."35 In the confident affirmation
that all law, whatever its form, "must be in its nature mutable and
3"Cf. Holland. "The original, and still the popular conception of a
'law' is a command, disobedience to which will be punished, prescribing a
cause of action." Jurisprudence (13th ed. 1924) 16.
133Dillon, Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America (1894) 183.
Cf. Pound "The original New York Code of Civil Procedure failed of
effect in many important particulars with respect to which its provisions
were well calculated to achieve the ends sought because so many of thejudges who were first called upon to administer it were determined to limit
its operations and preserve the principles and the dogmas of the older pro-
cedure wherever possible." (citing Cases) Some Principles of Procedural
Reform (1910) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 388, 390.
134Samuel Johnson, Life of Milton.
"35The idea has been often stated, e.g. Macintosh "The science of law
is continually struggling to combine inflexible rules with transactions and
relations perpetually varying," and Coleridge said. "The two antagonistic
powers or opposite powers of the state ubder which all other state interests
are comprised are those of permanence and progression." Both quoted by
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temporary," one at first glance beholds something startling-but all
that natural law ever stood for is still implicit in the qualification,
which follows-"except those principles of justice and right that
are rooted in the moral convictions of enlightened men." 130
In the Harvard Law School -were three men who contributed
generously to the development of American juristic thought in the
fruitful period between Story and Pound. They were Langdell,
Ames and Gray
Without a scientific method there can be no science. If the laws
is to be regarded as a science, albeit a social science-legal method
must necessarily be scientific method. It was Christopher Columbus
Langdell who, by his system of case study, introduced the char-
acteristic method of scientific investigation into the study of law.
His experiment seems to be an extremely early attempt to apply'
the inductive method of the laboratory to matters foreign to the
natural or physical sciences.237 In these few, words the story of his
c6ntribution to the science of law by way of giving to it a
scientific-method is told. The effect of his contribution has been
revolutionary-its effects are indeed immeasurable. Langdell was
one of those men whose published works, though extremely val-
uable, give no adequate idea of his labors, nor of the extent to
which he has, through his students, influenced legal thought.sB
Perhaps Langdell's jurisprudential technique is best illustrated in
Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930) 289, note; Sir Henry
Maine: "With these (progressive races of men) social necessities and social
opinions are always more or less in advance of law. Law is stable; society
is progressive. How shall this gulf be narrowed wInch has a perpetual
tendency to reopen?" Ancient Law (Third American, Fifth London cd.
1888) XVI, Pound. "Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still. Hence
all thinking about law has struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands
of the need of stability and of the need of change." Interpretations of Legal
History (1923).
1
.'
8Dillon, Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America (1894) 29737Langdell, A Selection of Cases -on the Law of Contracts (1871)
Preface; Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science (1887) 21 Am. L. Rev. 123;
Pollock, The Late Professor Langdell (1906) 22 Law Quar. Rev. 353,
Wambaugh, Professor Langdell-A View of His Career (1906) 20 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, The Nation of July 12, 1906, Fox, Professor Langdell-His
Personal Influence (1906) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 7, Beale, Professor Langdell-
His Later Teaching Days Ibid. 9; Jeremiah Smith, Professor Christopher
C. Langdell (1906) 2 Proced. Bar Assoc., State of N. H. 342. For a quite
different estimate of Langdell, characterizing him as a "bookish man" re-
sponsible for the divorce of legal education from the realities- of legal prac-
tice see Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? (1933) 81
Umv. of Pa. L. Rev. 907, Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Educa-
tion (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 723. 7. Am. L. School Rev. 894.
-
38Jeremah Smith, Professor Christopher C. Langdell (1906) 2 Proced.
Bar Assoc., State of N. H. 342.
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his article "Classification of Rights and Wrongs" 1i 9 which reveals
that when he essayed a problem in general jurisprudence he did so
according to the most careful methods of the best exemplars of the,
analytical school. It is analysis and classification-but it is not
mechanical analysis and classification, rather re-analysts and re-
classification, in answer to a changing law conditioned by the time
and place in which it must operate.
If only for the reason that James Barr Ames was the most
promising of "Langdell's Freshmen" and that he did more than
any single) individual to establish the Langdell method of instruc-
tion as the standard of virtually all the better law schools, he would
merit a prominent place in the story of American juristic develop-
ment. But great as such an achievement was, Ames did infinitely
,more. A science of jurisprudence unless it be grounded upon a
sound and thoroughgoing legal history is not worthy of the name.
Now it was Ames who supplied much of the historical learning
upon which Jurisprudence has since builded. Ie was America's
first significant legal historian and he probably still stands as our
first legal historian today Though he wrote no comparible insti-
tutional treatise, his services to legal history have frequently been
compared to those of Maitland, whose contemporary he was.
1 40
Both were passionately and narrowly devoted to the Common Law
system to the exclusion of much help that a moderate use of the
comparative method might have afforded and both were possessed
by the sense of the supreme importance of a knowledge of the
sources of legal doctrine. The very efforts which insured the rapid
success of a scientific method in law teaching, i.e., the preparation
of many case books, prevented Dean Ames from giving to the world
any more than a- fragment of the result of his labors in this field.
It is to be regretted that now when the movement for a scientific
legal history seems to be gaining considerable momentum, 14 there
is apparently no Ames among us.
13OLangdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (2nd ed. 1908) 1-40,
219-260 (1900) 13 Harv. L. Rev. 37, 659.
-l4OWigmore, James Barr Ames (1910) 4 Ill. L. Rev. 509, 510; James
Barr Ames (1910) 58 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 289, 291 Mack, James Barr Ames
-His Personal Influence (1910) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 336.
l4lHappily attention is now being focused upon the need for the collec-
tion and preservation of the materials from which the history of American
law must eventually be written. See Joseph H. Beale, The Study of Ameri-
can Legal History (1933) 39 West Va. Quar. 95, and Carl Wheaton, A
Movement to Stimulate the Writers and Study the Legal -istory of the
United States (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 209. Recently The American Legal
History Society has been organized for the purpose of advancing the
knowledge of the history of American law by making available and pro-
moting the preservation of legal studies and the publication of selected
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Viewing Ames' legal doctrine as a whole, one must conclude
that he was not a law reformer, if by law reform is meant a pro-
nounced departure from the course traced by previous legal de-
velopment. Being one of the finest exemplars of the historical
school, he preferred to stand szper antiquas vias, and where he
advocated a doctrine at variance with prevailing judicial opinion,
invariably it was because he believed that opinion to represent a
departure from an earlier and better standard. This does not imply
that he was a worshipper of precedents as such, on the contrary,
he was a bold critic. But, as distinguished from an individual pre-
cedent, a doctrine established by a long course of judicial decision
was quite different matter. True to the philosophy of the historical
school, long established doctrine, "hallowed by prescription," had
acquired an almost sacred character for Ames and departure from
it was heresy. Of course the social reformer, impatient of the slow
process of legal evolution, will criticize such an attitude of mind,
but it is not at all inconsistent with the possession of a keen sense
of justice and with the frequent characterization of him as one who
taught law "as it ought to be."' 42 To put it another way, Ames'
means of escape from worship of precedent which shocked so many
others, was his belief that it was the function of the law teacher
to weld a body of mutually consistent and coherent principles from
the decisions. To his mind there was but one right principle upon
a given point, and if the decisions failed to recognize it, so much
the worse for the decisions. He would not permit his reverence
for the doctrine born of the cases to blind him to the nature of the
moral principle that lay behind that doctrine.14 3
The same peribd that saw Langdell and Ames at Harvard sa\v
the production of America's finest book on analytical jurisprudence
in John Chipman-Gray's "Nature and Sources of the Law.'" In
the midst of Gray's scholarly writing in the field of Real Property,
there appeared in 1892 the prolegomena to the later lectures-is
essay, "Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence."' 45 The
essay seems to justify the conclusion that for the analytical jurist
source materials and monographic studies. See Harms, Association of
American Law Schools Holds Annual Meeting (1934) 20 A. B. A. J.
119-120. The American Historical Association has a cooperating Com-
mittee on Legal History.14-IVilliston, James Barr Ames-His Services to Legal Education
(1910) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 330-332.
143Such a philosophy is implicit in his Law and Morals (1908) 2- Harv.
L. Rev. 97
'44The first edition appeared in 1909. The second edition by Professor
Gray's son, Roland Gray, appeared in 1921.
145(1892) 6 Harv. L. Rev. 21.
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an abiding struggle for precise definition is the sine qua non-yet,
Gray seems to have wisely avoided the temptation of any such
thing as Dean Wigmore styles "a science of nomothetics," that
seducer of so many American analytical jurists. Now the cause of
analytical jurisprudence could not possibly have been entrusted to
a better advocate than Gray For Gray recognized the valuable
contribution which analytical jurisprudence could make, at the
same time recognizing its shortcomings. -le was surprisingly tol-
erant-though he chose the analytical method as his own vehicle,
he ungrudgingly acknowledged all of the value which the historical
and the comparative method could teach 'him, unlike so many
analytical jurists, who by the magic of nomenclature and tight
classification devise messianic legal schemes to save us from all
further doubt and worry Gray may be said to have somewhat
doubted the value of analytical jurisprudence on the purely con-
structive side to him it was rather a very effective and a very
necessary equipment of the sincere critic. He puts it thus
"Especially valuable is the negative side of analytic study On
the constructive side it may be narrow and unfruitful, but there is
no better means for the puncture of wind-bags.' 40
Gray wrote at a time when the historical school, at least in
this country, was still possessed of its full vigor,"47 and yet he sue-
ceeded in restoring no little portion of its faded glory to analytical
jurisprudence. A partial explanation of this feat lies in what has
been said, a further explanation 15 to be found in the fact that,
though appreciative of the contribution which the historical school
had made, he saw certain shortcomings in the historical method
which its own enthusiastic advocates did not themselves see. He
saw that if you talked of evolution and flux you did not do practical
things. Gray appears to have had an insight into a juristic problem
which since the rise of Sociological Jurisprudence and Realism has
become the storm center of jurisprudential discussion. The neces-
sity of catching hold of something and holding it in stability for a
moment while you do something useful with it seems implicit in
this observation
"I by no means regret this [the emphasis of the historical
14Gray. Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence (1892) 6
Harv. L. Rev. 21, 23.
'
47At the time Gray's Nature and Sources of the Law made its appear-
ance in 1909, Pound's call for a sociological jurisprudence in America had
already gone forth but it is not likely that it had by that time made any
considerable number of converts. See Pound, A New School of jurists
(1903) 4 "Umv. of Neb. Studies No. 3, Do We Need a Philoso'-hy of L'iw*
(1905) 5 Col. Rev. 339; The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence (1907)
19 Green Bag 607 31 Repts. Am. Bar Assn. 911.
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school upon legal evolution], and I fully recognize the fact that
legal conceptions are constantly changing; yet, to borrow a figure
from the shop, it seems well at times to take account of stock, and
to consider where legal studies and investigations have in fact
brought us, although we believe it is neither possible nor desirable
to prevent their carrying us further.'
45
In this too-little-read prolegomena Gray defined Jurisprudence
as "the science which deals with the principles on which courts
ought to decide cases."' 49 That is the definition 'of an analytical
jurist, but it is also the definition of a philosopher; it is certainly
not Austinian. The preliminaries set forth in this essay of 1892
were fully developed in the lectures at Columbia which finally as-
sumed the form of the "Nature and Sources." The book treats
first of the nature of law, including- legal rights and duties, legal
persons, the state, the law of courts, the law of nations, jurispru-
dence, and secondly, of the sources of law including- statutes,
judicial precedents, opinions of experts, custom, morality, and
equity.
Gray enumerates-the usual three possible approaches to juristic
study of the pre-sociological period-the historical, the systematic
or analytic, and the deontological or ethical. True to the time-
honored formula for a book that will merit the imprimatur of the
analytical school; Gray treats upon legal rights and duties.iio Few
of such analytical treatments have much abiding value as general-
izations, though they may be of untold merit in the analysis of
concrete situations. It is therefore possible to criticise Gray's treat-
ment of legal rights and duties only by comparison with the
handling of similar materials by such analysts as Salmond,15 '
Hohfeld, ' 52 and Kocourek.53 Of these it may be said that each
system is capable of being the best devised-provided that all
lawyerkind agreed to believe that any one of them is that best.
Gray's treatment has much to commend it for it claims far less in
14Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence (1892) 6
Harv. L. Rev. 21, 22.
'9OSome Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence (1892) 6 Han,.
L. Rev. 21, 27 Compare the definitions of "Jurisprudence" as found in
Austin and Holland and there observe the complete exclusion of the
deontological element.
'SOGray, Nature and Sources of the*Law (2nd ed. 1921) Ch. 1, pp. 7-26.
'I'Salmond, Jurisprudence (8th ed: 1930) Chs. XII and XIII, pp. 273,
276.
-52Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Ju-
dicial Reasoning. (1923) 22-193. (1913) 23 Yale L. J. .16; (1917) 26 Yale
L. J. 710. See especially the Jural Opposites and Jural Correlatives set out
in Fundamental Legal Conceptions 65 (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 710.
53~Kocourek, Jural Relations (2nd ed. 1926), especially the Tables set
out at lp. 21, 27 and 28.
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the way of finality than do the more pretentious analyses of Hoh-
feld and Kocourek." 4
It is difficult to say just what the concept of the state and
sovereignty within the state mean to Gray At one time lie seems
to look upon the state as the whole body of the nation in the guise
of a personified unit greatly desirous that each member should
wash himself each day, but regretfully refraining from such a
command because it would be somewhat inconvenient to compel
such ablutions."'5 Elsewhere he intimates that the State may be
a figment of the imagination for which patriots may find it sweet
to die,"56 or a mask behind which the "real rulers" of society
may take refuge while subjecting the unknown citizens to their
will." 7 The test seems to indicate that these "real rulers" are
neither kings nor presidents, but they are political bosses. And so
far as sovereignty is identified it appears to reside in these sale
"real rulers" who create not only the state, but create and control
the courts as well. 58
Perhaps the portion of Gray's book of most permanent value
is his analysis of the Law of a state which he defines as "the rule
which the courts, that is, the judicial organs of that body lay down
for the determination of legal rights and duties."' We are told
that law is not a command of a sovereign, as Austin would have
us believe, nor is the foundation of the law to be found in the
common consciousness of the people, where Savigny found it.
Further, it is inaccurate to state that judges discover the Law
as a scientist might discover laws of Nature, for a judge cannot
make a mistake in the same way that Newton could inasmuch as the
"difference between the Judges and Sir Isaac is that a mistake by
Sir Isaac in calculating the orbit of the earth would not send it
spinning round the sun with an increased velocity, his answer to
the problem would be simply wrong; while if the Judges, in inves-
tigating the reasons on which the Law should be based come to a
wrong result, and give forth a rule which is discordant with the
eternal verities, it is none the less Law "10
"4For a contrary view attributing Gray's less neat system to a lack of
perception of his problem, see Vance, Review of Gray's Nature and Sources
of the Law (2nd ed. 1922) 32 Yale L. J. 210, 211. Professor Vance kept
the Hohfeldian faith to the last. See his Handbook of the Law of Insurance(2nd ed. 1930) Preface to the 2nd ed. V
"' SGray, Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921) 82.
156 Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921) 67, 70.
157Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921) 69.
15sNature and Sources (2nd ed. 1921) 70, 122, 123.
"'9Nature and Sources (2nd ed. 1921) 84.
16ONature and Sources (2nd ed. 1921) 101.
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It was just about the time Professor Gray expressed these views
that James Coolidge Carter's Laz, Its Ongin, Growth and Func-
tion appeared, proclaiming that the judges were the discoverers
and not the makers of the law.1 6' A like view had been stoutly
argued by Professor William G. Hammond.10 2 In refuting this
proposition, Gray may be charged with flying to the other extreme.
He took the position that even statutes duly passed by the legisla-
ture are not law, but merely "sources of law" upon which the
judges draw in exercising their lawmaking function.10 3 Most of us
today would agree with Mr. Justice Cardozo, that the truth is
midway between the extremes represented by Carter and Gray210
Of course, if one accepts Gray's definition of law as the rules
applied by the judges of any sovereign state the conclusion that
international law is not law in the proper sense is inevitable. Only
rules applied by a court established by the nations would be Law
in the proper sense. 6
To Gray, Jurisprudence means "the statement and systematic
arrangement of the rules followed by the courts and of the principles
involved in those rules."'' 66 Within his analytical school there are
three kinds of jurisprudence, particular jurisprudence, comparative
jurisprudence, and general jurisprudence. Particular jurisprudence
considers the law of a particular people. Comparative jurisprudence
is the comparison of the laws of two or more peoples, and general
jurisprudence is the comparison of all the legal systems of the world.
As there are many legal systems which are practically unknown to
us, general jurisprudence as a science based on observation does
not yet exist.l 67
As an analytical jurist, one might suppose that Gray would
deny that the deontological element enters into the science of juris-
prudence. On the contrary, he tells us that particular jurisprudence
is not limited in its subject matter to the rules which have been
actually. applied by the courts, but it considers also what the rule
'
61For discussion of Carter's views see supra p. 27.
162In his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries *(1890) for discussion of
Professor Hammond's views see supra p. 27.
163Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921) 125, 170.
le4Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 124-135. See
also pp. 104-110.
165Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921) 130-132.
166Nature and Sources of the Law (2nd ed. 1921) 133.
167Nature and Sources (2nd ed. 1921) 135-136. The field over which
Gray would have his "general jurisprudence" range to the point of including
"the law of many of the nations and tribes" (primitive law) would seem to
carry with it by necessary implication an admission that popular custom is
at least in some instances law.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
should be in cases where no rules exist. As soon as a rule is de-
clared on a given point, the question of what the law on that sub-
ject should be ceases to be a subject of jurisprudence and becomes
a question for the science of legislation. The same principle he
would carry over into comparative jurisprudence. If we are com-
paring two legal systems, the question of what the law ought to
be on any given point is proper unless the matter is definitely
settled in both jurisdictions, then the question of what the law
ought to be is no longer appropriate.
With Holland's definition of Jurisprudence as a formal
analytical science,105 Gray. cannot agree, it would exclude too
much. Nor can he agree with Lightwood that a science of Juris-
prudence should deal only with the law that is demonstrated to
"have real basis in the wants of the people;"'10 that more nearly
approximates a definition for the Science of Legislation. The
history of i'nstitutions is admitted to be a valuable aid to the
understanding of their nature, but Gray cannot subscribe to the
tenets of the historical school since they beget literary rather than
practical study and hinder the grasping of the law of the present
time as a whole.
To the late Professor Munroe Smith of Georgetown and Co-
lumbia must go the credit for at least two achievements of un-
portance. He contributed the standard American treatment of
European legal systems.'Y To Smith also must go no small share
of the credit for introducing Jhermg to andl.interpreting him for
American readers.1 7 1
For a few brief years, the views of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
excited the interest of these who concerned tienmselves with the
development of American Jurisprudence. Hohfeld is dead and
perhaps no more convincing evidence of the death of that par-
ticular variant of analytical jurisprudence -which he so painstaking-
ly expounded could be found than the, all but complete albandon-
s68"Jurisprudence is therefore not the- material science of those por-
tions of the law which various nations have in common, but the formal
science of these relations of mankind which are generally recognized as hav-
ing legal consequences." Holland, Jurisprudence (3rd ed. 1886) 8.
l'Lightwood, The Nature and Positive Law (1883) 10.
170Munroe Smith, The Development of European Law (1928) Of tn-
portance also is his lecture, Jurisprudence (1908)
"'Munroe Smith, Four German Jurists, Bruns, Windscheid, Jhering,
Greist (1895) 10 Pol. Sci. Q. 664, (1896) 11 Ibid. 278,,(1897) 12 Ibid. 21.
In these articles, Jhering is treated at length, Bruns, Windscheid and Grelst
are treated but briefly.
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ment of Hohfeldianism by the School whose faculty he last
graced" 2
Hohfeld was a severe thinker, for he was, in essence, the
most certain of certainty lawyers. Because so much of juristic
thought following the Hohfeld pattern coming down to us at a
comparatively recent date-73 has been so disappointing in point of
appeal to any great. number of persons, it may be doubted whether
the legal analysis which Professor Hoflfeld offered would have
enjoyed any wide acceptance had he lived to further advocate it.
Yet it may be that we have been at times a bit unfair in appraising
the man and his work. We ought not to speak with too great
finality about the potentialities of unfinished business that can
never be finished for want of the craftsman. What Hohfeld at-
tempted in his Fundamental Legal Conceptions was17 ' in reality
mere prolegomena- what was to follow might have proved
extremely profitable. Professoi Hohfeld began to build an
analytical jurisprudence in part at least for the same reason that
Gray had, simply because he believed there was no more sharply
pointed instrument for the puncture of windbags." But behind,
over and beyond this imtial structure of analytical jurisprudence
72It would seem that since Professor Vance has passed on, the last of
the Holifeldians is Yale's Professor Corbin. See Corbin, Cases on the Law
of Contracts (1933) X, Corbin's Anson on Contracts (Am. Ed. 1930)
"Preface to the Third American Edition" VI, Rights and Duties (1924) 33
Yale L. 3. 501, What Is a Legal Relation? (1922) 5 Ill. L. Q. 50; Jural
Relations and Their Classification (1920) 30 Yale L. J. 226; Legal Analysis
and Terminology (1919) 29 Yale L. J. 163, Offer and Acceptance, and
Some of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 169; Terminol-
ogy and Classification in Fundamental. Jural Relations (1921) 4 Am. L.
School Rev. 607 Vance, A Handbook of the Law of Insurance (2nd ed.
1930). Preface to the'2nd ed. V
It is submitted that any scheme of rigid classification of legal relations,
if followed through consistently, will make-for a system of legal interpreta-
tion in which certainty is a most prominent characteristic. This is fervently
denied by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook. See Cook, Holifeld's Con-
tributions to the Scheme of Law (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 721-2. In the light of
the fluid kand of law advocated in some of Llewellyn's writings, such as A
Realistic jurisprudence-the Next Step (1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 431 and
Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound (1931) 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1222, it is of interest to read his editorial, as a student at
Yale, upon the death of Professor Holifeld (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 795, 4 Am.
L. S. Rev. 409.
173Kocourek, Jural Relations (1928). Of particular interest is tie intro-
duction by Wigmore; Kocourek, An Introduction to the Science of Law
(1930) especially Ch. IV
174Two articles,'the first appearing in (1913) 23 Yale L. J. 16 and the
second appearing in (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 710; both reprinted in. Funda-
mental Legal Conceptions (Hohfeld's miscellaneous legal essays edited with
an appreciation of the author's work by WV W Cook. 1923) 23, 65.
1'5Gray, Nature and Sources of tie Law (2nd ed. 1921), Some
Definitions and Questions in jurisprudence (1892) 6 Harv. L. Rev. 21, 23.
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lay a program which if it failed to meet all the demands of the
rising Sociological School was, nevertheless, a program in many
ways admirable, broadly conceived and constructive in purpose. 110
In his program, Hohfeld postulated six "departments of general
jurisprudence" wherein intensive and extensive study and research
should be fostered. These departments included
1. Historical, or genetic, jurisprudence.
2. Comparative, or eclectic, jurisprudence.
3. Formal, or analytical, jurisprudence.
4. Critical, or teleological, jurisprudence.
5. Legislative, or constructive, jurisprudence.
6. Dynamic, or functional, jurisprudence.
The answer to this elaborate plea for a multi-compartmental juris-
prudence is, perhaps, that Sociological jurisprudence comprises all
these varied techniques and methods in an effective single instru-
ment. But the fact stands that in plan and ambition, Hohfeld was
far more than an analytical jurist pure and simple. Analytical
jurisprudence was simply the one department of six wherein his
short life permitted him to work.
In his analytical work, Hohfeld argued that what law needed
was uniformity of method. In the perfection of an agreement upon
the ideal method lay the only possible answer to the quest for
certainty. Through faith in method, he was able to arrive at funda-
mental concepts177 and these legal concepts were deemed applicable
to what seemed to be the most divergent and dissimilar branches
of the law Let Hohfeld tell you how it worked
"By such a process it becomes possible not only to discover essen-
tial similarities and illuminating analogies in the midst of what
appears superficially to be infinite and hopeless variety, but also
to discern common principles of justice and policy underlying the
various jural problems involved. An indirect but very practical,
consequence is that it.frequently becomes feasible by virtue of such
176Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law; Have Amermcan
Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities
of the Present Day? Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923) Essay VIII,
332-384.
1TTThese constituted the "fundamental legal conceptions" according to
Hohfeld.j ra Opposites - right privilege power immunity
.ura. no-right duty disability liability
Jural Correlatives ) right privilege power ' immunityI duty no-right liability disability
See Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923) Essay I. pp. 23, 36 (1913) 23 Yale
L. J. 16, 29. Cf. Kocourek, Jural Relations (1928) Ch. IV, Wigmore,
Introduction to Kocourek's Jural Relations (1928), Wigmore, Nonio-
Thetics (1914) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
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analysis, to use as persuasive authorities judicial precedents that
might otherwise seem altogether irrelevant. In short, the deeper
the analysis, the greater becomes one's perception of fundamental
unity and harmony in the law."' I s
Now there is much value in Hohfeldianism-there can be no
doubt that it will make for clear thinking upon many a sadly mud-
dled problem.-,P But as a means of juristic salvation it has a fatal
defect; it is the same defect which proves fatal to Kocourekism
and to Wigmiorean nomothetics. You cannot make men throw
away age-old words and age-old ways of thought, albeit they be,
loose words and slovenly ways. In the gospel of nomothetics, who-
ever its preacher, the lawyer has had little faith.
Today a great deal is heard about the interrelations between
law and economics. Indeed, it would seem that all of juristic Real-
ism which does not answer to the description of Psychological
Realism may be labeled Economic Realism. Long before the rise
of militant realism-economic or otherwise-economic materials
were introduced into jurisprudence as a factor conditioning the
development of law by exponents of ,the economic interpretation
of legal history. In 'America a positivist economic interpretation
was grafted upon the orthodox English analytical jurisprudence, s0
which simply meant that, law being regarded as the command of
the sovereign, the sovereign was conceived to be a mere mouth-
piece through which economic forces speak. The foremost ex-
ponent of this creed in America" was Brooks Adams who tells us
that "law is a resultant of forces wlch arise from the struggle
for existence among men," and that Law "is the wiU of a sover-
eign precisely in the same way that earth's orbit, which is a re-
sultant of a conflict between centrifugal and centripetal force, is
the wvill of a sovereign. Both the law and the orbit are neces-
sities."'' In another place he tells us that, inasmuch as the law
is the resultant of forces in conflict, it "must ultimately be de-
flected in the direction of the stronger and be used to crown the
victor."' 8 2 In other words nothing had power or strength to with-
stand the march of the economic law-and economic determinism
17sFundamental Legal Conceptions as. Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1923) Essay I. pp. 23, 64, (1916) 23 Yale
L. J. 16, 57
179The several law review articles by Professor Corbin dealing with
numerous knotty problems in the law of Contracts bear ample witness to
the effectiveness of clear-thinlng analysis along Hohfeldian lines.
'SOPound, Interpretations of Legal History (1923) 94.
'
8
'Brooks Adams, Centralization and the Law (1906) 23.
'
82Centralization and the Law (1906) 133.
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has been read into English analytical jurisprudence.' 83 Brooks
Adams found confirmation of his views in the doctrinal and in-
stitutional history of the common law, 8 4 while another stock ar-
gument for the economic interpretation was derived from the rules
of the common law dealing with injuries through the fault of a
fellow servant and the doctrine of assumption of risk. This latter
argument received a conclusive answer in a critical examination
of the cases upon which Brooks Adams relied and of some others
upon which he did not rely, by the late Francis Marion Burdick in
his memorable article "Is the Law an Expression of Class Selfish-
ness ?,,ls On the basis of the evidence, Professor Burdick rejected
the notion that law is nothing more than the resultant of the clash-
ing of greed-sodden classes or the product of blind economic
forces untempered by moral and social forces, as untenable. His
statement has an abiding value, it ought to be read by that group,
so vociferous today, who would explain all legal phenomena solely
on economic grounds.
Such in the main were the rather scattered efforts of American
scholarship in the field of Jurisprudence before the advent of Roscoe
Pound.
The work of Oliver Wendell Holmes chronologically belongs to
the period of which I have written but in point of content it has
kinship .with-indeed it fathered-the thought of Pound, Frank,
Llewellyn, Rodell and scores of other realists and iconoclasts.'
Their work is another story that must wait upon a later telling.
'S3Pound has pointed out that the evidence adduced by the adherents
of the economic interpretation was derived from legislation. Thus the
dogma of the analytical school which made law the command of a sovereign(body of rules enforced by the sovereign's judicial organs) Interpretations
of Legal History (1923) 96-97 The command theory fairly shouts in this
statement from Adams "The dominant class, whether it be the priests or
usurers or soldiers or bankers, will shape the law to favor themselves, and
that code will most nearly approach the ideal of justice of each particular
age which favors most perfectly the dominant class." Adams, Centralization
and the Law (1906) 63-64.
28 4The arguments from history which Adams made are effectively an-
swered by Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (1923) 101ff.185(1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 349. The article stands, together with
Pound's pages (96-101) in his Interpretations of Legal History (1923), as'
the classic answer to the arguments which Brooks Adams advanced.iS6For an explanation of Holmes' fatherhood see Lucey, Natural Law
and American Legal Realism, their Respective Contributions to a Theory
of Law in a Democratic Society (1942) 30 Geo. L. J. 493.
